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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, the late William T. Muse, then Dean of
the University of Richmond School of Law, observed that although
there was considerable law in Virginia relating to churches this law
was widely scattered throughout the statutes and the cases. To
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remedy this state of affairs, Dean Muse wrote a concise but com-
plete summary of these laws.1 In the quarter-century that has
elapsed since Dean Muse's article was published, Virginia has
adopted a new constitution, many church-related statutes have
been enacted and a number of church-related cases have been de-
cided, some of which have refined established principles and others
of which have created or recognized new principles. The natural
consequence of the foregoing activity has been to re-establish the
need that prompted Dean Muse to write in the first instance. Ac-
cordingly, the following is offered to the profession, in memory of
the scholar and friend who authored the original, as a contempo-
rary restatement of Virginia laws affecting churches.
II. DEFINITIONS
Church
The word "church" carries various meanings depending upon
the circumstances in which it is used. In a purely physical sense,
"church" may refer only to the church building or house of wor-
ship. In other contexts it may refer to "the great body of persons
holding the Christian belief, or ... to those adhering to one of
the several denominations . . . at large or in a definite terri-
tory; and it may mean the collective membership of persons con-
stituting the congregation of a single permanent place of wor-
ship."'2 As used in section 57-7 of the Virginia Code, "church,"
"religious society" and "religious congregation" are used as al-
ternate terms which "apply to the local congregation, and not to
the church at large in its denominational sense." 3
Congregational Church
In a congregational church "[e]ach congregation is an indepen-
dent sovereign body, subject to no higher ecclesiastical author-
ity, and each is the final judge of the true faith, doctrine and
practice of the church."'4 Interrelation or cooperation of congre-
gational churches "does not destroy or even impair [their]
independence. 5
1. Muse, Virginia Laws Affecting Churches, 43 VA. L. REV. 119 (1957).
2. Forsberg v. Zehm, 150 Va. 756, 764-65, 143 S.E. 284, 286 (1928).
3. Moore v. Perkins, 169 Va. 175, 180, 192 S.E. 806, 809 (1937).
4. Cheshire v. Giles, 144 Va. 253, 257, 132 S.E. 479, 480 (1926).
5. Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 698, 152 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1967).
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Hierarchical Church
Churches "that are subject to control by super-congregational
bodies"' are hierarchical churches. The Episcopal and Presby-
terian churches are examples of this type.
Member Of A Church
"To constitute [one] a member of any church, two points at
least are essential, without meaning to say that others are not so,
a profession of its faith and a submission to its government. '7
Minister
A "minister," as referred to in section 20-23 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, "is the head of a religious congregation, society or order.
He is set apart as [their] leader. He is the person elected or se-
lected in accordance with the ritual, bylaws or discipline of the
order.""
Proprietary Right
"A proprietary right [of a hierarchical church in local church
property] is a right customarily associated with ownership, title,
and possession. It is an interest or a right of one who exercises
dominion over a thing or property, of one who manages and con-
trols." It is a contract right.10
HI. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Virginia became the birthplace of religious freedom in America
when the historic Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted by
George Mason, was unanimously adopted by "the representatives
of the good People of Virginia, assembled in full and free Conven-
tion""1 on June 12, 1776. The principles first enunciated in section
16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights12 formed the basis for Vir-
6. Id. Hierarchical churches were found in Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. (12 Hans.) 103, 12 S.E.
228 (1890); Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 201 S.E.2d 752 (1974); and Green
v. Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 272 S.E.2d 181 (1980).
7. Brooke v. Shacklett, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 301, 320 (1856).
8. Cramer v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 561, 567, 202 S.E.2d 911, 915 (1974).
9. Green v. Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 555, 272 S.E.2d 181, 186 (1980).
10. Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 507, 201 S.E.2d 752, 758 (1974).
11. Preface to Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1 REv. CODE of 1819 (Va.) ch. 3, at 31.
12. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharg-
ing it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and
therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian for-
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ginia's Statute for Religous Freedom,"3 which was drafted by
Thomas Jefferson and adopted on December 16, 1785.14 These
principles also are embedded in the Constitution of Virginia, 15 as
well as that of the United States." This consitutional guarantee
has been before the Virginia Supreme Court on a number of occa-
sions and has served as the basis for (1) reversing that part of the
sentence imposed on certain juvenile defendants that they "attend
Sunday [s]chool and church each Sunday hereafter for a period of
one year, and present satisfactory evidence of such attendance at
the conclusion of each month to the [p]robation [o]fficer;" 17 (2) re-
versing that part of a custody decree that required "that the chil-
dren be reared in the Jewish faith and that they attend a Jewish
Sunday school and a service in the synagogue each week;"1 (3)
holding it error to allow a witness to be questioned concerning his
religious opinions;19 (4) holding void "a restriction imposed by the
terms of a bequest, requiring as the condition of its enjoyment,
that the legatee should be a member of any religious sect or de-
nomination, as directly violative of this policy; ''2° and (5) for de-
claring unconstitutional that part of Item 210 of the Appropriation
Act of 195421 that "purports to authorize payments for tuition, in-
stitutional fees and other designated expenses of eligible children
who attend sectarian schools. '22
On the other side of the ledger, the Virginia Supreme Court has
bearance, love, and charity towards each other.
Id. at 32.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
14. See id. at §57-2 for a more recent reaffirmation.
15. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
16. As this article is focusing on Virginia law, any discusison of federal law is beyond its
scope. However, the practitioner cannot afford to ignore federal considerations when dealing
with constitutional issues because they can be a source of alternative remedies as well as a
different forum in which to raise them. See, e.g., Barrett v. Commonwealth, No. 82-6047,
slip op. at 11 (4th Cir. Sept. 20, 1982) (striking down that portion of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
217 (Cum. Supp. 1982) that denies to inmates of correctional facilities the legal right to
change their names because, as applied to a prisoner who wished to adopt a Muslim name in
conformance with his religious beliefs, "the statute offends against the free exercise of reli-
gion guaranteed by the first amendment").
See also Curry, James Madison and the Burger Court: Converging Views of Church-
State Separation, 56 IND. L.J. 615 (1981) and Note, Government Noninvolvement with Re-
ligious Institutions, 59 TEx. L. REv. 921 (1981).
17. Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 337, 38 S.E.2d 444, 445 (1946).
18. Lundeen v. Struminger, 209 Va. 548, 551, 165 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1969).
19. Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 632 (1846).
20. Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r., 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804, 814 (1854).
21. 1954 Va. Acts, ch. 708.
22. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 428, 89 S.E.2d 851, 857 (1955).
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concluded that legislation authorizing tuition "loans" to students
in sectarian institutions did not violate the constitutional guaran-
tee of religious freedom,23 and it has consistently upheld the Sun-
day Closing Law24 against challenges that the law violates the reli-
gious freedom of those who wish to engage in prohibited labor on
Sunday.2 5
In a case raising considerations parallel to religious freedom, the
Virginia Supreme Court has held that, although it is proper to ask
jurors in capital cases if they hold religious scruples about the
death penalty, it would invade the privacy of a potential juror if he
were required to answer the following questions: "(1)'What is your
religious preference?' (2) 'Do you attend a local church?' (3)
'Would you classify yourself as a regular or occasional at-
tender?' "26 In a federal case wherein three secular day care centers
sought a declaratory judgment invalidating a provision of Virginia
law exempting child care centers "operated or conducted under the
auspices of a religious institution ' 27 from state licensing require-
ments, the District Court declined to consider the possible applica-
tion of the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom on the
ground that the plaintiffs failed to establish their standing to raise
the issue due to their failure to show that they had received, or
would receive, any injury from this law.2 8 The Virginia Supreme
23. Miller v. Ayres, 213 Va. 251, 191 S.E.2d 261 (1972). The court also held that this
legislation did not violate article IV, § 16 (no appropriations to religious bodies), or article
X, § 8 (taxes to be levied only for expenses of government). However, as the "loans" author-
ized by this legislation were really conditional gifts or grants, it was unconstitutional as
violative of article VIII, § 10 (no appropriations to nonpublic schools), and article VIII, § 11
(aid to nonpublic higher education). Current statutes dealing with state aid to private edu-
cation are: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-38.11 TO .19 [Tuition Assistance Grant Act] (Repl. Vol.
1980); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-38.30 to .44 [Virginia Education Loan Authority] (Repl. Vol.
1980); and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-38.45 to .53 [College Scholarship Assistance Act] (Repl. Vol.
1980). VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-24 and -25 (Repl. Vol. 1981) are the statutory provisions relat-
ing to gifts by cities, counties and towns to local charitable organizations. The former con-
tains a provision that the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. are not prohibited "sectarian" socie-
ties, and the latter can be read as authorizing gifts to sectarian groups providing housing for
those over age sixty, conducting a hospital, providing firefighting, lifesaving or rescue ser-
vices, or engaged in commemorating historical events.
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-341 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
25. The most recent case is Malibu Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 467, 237
S.E.2d 782 (1977). Other cases are collected at note 187, infra.
26. Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 675, 283 S.E.2d 905, 910 (1981).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-196.3 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
28. Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 480 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Va. 1979).
When this same matter was brought back before the court by the same plaintiffs in Forest
Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 487 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1980), it was
dismissed as res judicata. This dismissal was vacated (without opinion) on appeal in Forest
1982]
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Court recognized the presence of constitutional questions concern-
ing the free exercise of religion on the appeal of a church from a
conviction of violating a town ordinance that local license decals be
displayed on motor vehicles, but it declined to discuss these ques-
tions. Instead, the court reversed the church's conviction on the
ground that the trial court erred in not allowing the accused, on
procedural grounds, to litigate the issue whether the town ordi-
nance was a regulatory measure or a revenue measure.2 9
IV. PROPERTY
A. Acquisition and Ownership of Property
Although the Constitution of Virginia reflects a historic and con-
tinuing determination to prevent the establishment of any religion
in the Commonwealth, and to maintain the separation of church
and state, the Constitution nevertheless provides that "[tihe Gen-
eral Assembly .. .may secure the title to church property to an
extent to be limited by law."30 The importance of such legislative
assurance can hardly be overstated due to a one hundred and fifty
year old rule established by the Virginia Supreme Court that, un-
less expressly validated by statute, a trust for indefinite benefi-
ciaries is void if the named trustee is an individual or an unincor-
porated body." Thus, for example, in a case where a testator left a
bequest to be used for building a church, it was struck down be-
cause the statute at that time only authorized "conveyances" for
such purposes.3 2 Because of this background, particular attention
is paid to the language of the statutes in the following material.
1. Validity of Transfers for Religious Purposes
Although today it might generally be thought that transfers for
religious purposes may be freely made for the intended beneficiary,
purposes, etc., a careful reading of section 57-7 of the Virginia
Code, 3 the statute validating transfers for religious purposes, and
the decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court thereunder, clearly
Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard, 642 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1981).
29. Loudoun Baptist Temple v. Town of Leesburg, - Va. -, 292 S.E.2d 315 (1982).
30. VA. CONST. art. IV § 14(20).
31. Gallego's Ex'rs v. Attorney Gen., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450 (1832).
32. Seaburn v. Seaburn, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 423 (1859).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (Repl. Vol. 1981). The evolution of this statute is traced in
Maguire v. Loyd. 193 Va. 138, 67 S.E.2d 885 (1951), aff'd on rehearing, 194 Va. 266, 72
S.E.2d 631 (1952).
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demonstrates that this is not the case. Section 57-7 specifically au-
thorizes conveyances of land for the use or benefit34 of any church
as a place of public worship, a burial place or a residence for a
minister, 35 and as a residence for a bishop or clergyman who is an
officer of a church or church diocese and employed under its au-
thority and about its business, even though not in special charge of
a congregation. 6 In addition land that is adjacent to or near by the
land on which the church is situated may be conveyed as a location
for a parish house, a house for the meeting of societies or commit-
tees of the church or others for the transaction of business con-
nected with the church or as a place of residence for the sexton of
the church. The statute goes on to provide that if a church or
church diocese has (or is capable of securing the appointment of)
trustees, no gift, grant or bequest to or for its benefit shall fail for
insufficient description of the beneficiaries in, or the objects of, any
trust annexed thereto. 7 Instead, such gift, grant or bequest passes
to the trustees of the church or church diocese for religious and
benevolent uses as determined by the trustees with the approval of
the governing authority of the church or church diocese.3 8 The
statute concludes by providing that any devise for the use or bene-
fit of any church wherein no specific use or purpose is specified
shall be valid.
One must remember that the word "church" as used throughout
34. Anderson v. Richardson, 200 Va. 1, 104 S.E.2d 5 (1958) (alleged lack of local trustees
was not significant because proper trustees could be appointed at any time pursuant to VA.
CODE ANN. § 57-8 (Repl. Vo. 1981)).
35, Id. Where property is used for church purposes (minister's residence) at the time of
the conveyance, cessation of use for any enumerated church purpose does not create any
interest or standing in grantor's heirs; it is a matter of concern only to the Commonwealth.
36. See Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 201 S.E.2d 752 (1974).
37. In a case where testatrix created a testamentary trust that provided for the income to
be paid to or expended for the benefit of a church to "be used exclusively for one or more of
such purposes as are exempt from inheritance or transfer taxes under the laws of the United
States and the State of Virginia," the trial court held that the statute required that this
trust be administered by the church's trustees instead of those appointed in the will. In
reversing this decision, the Supreme Court stated that
any interest in [personal] property, legal or equitable, that may be given or be-
queathed is covered . . . [by the language summarized in the text, and thus nothing
prevents a] . . . settlor from creating a trust for the benefit of a church or religious
congregation and specifically providing the manner in which the trust corpus is to be
administered.
Maguire v. Loyd, 193 Va. 138, 140, 146, 67 S.E.2d 885, 887, 891 (1951), aff'd on rehearing,
194 Va. 266, 72 S.E.2d 631 (1952).
38. In Owens v. Bank of Glade Spring, 195 Va. 1138, 81 S.E.2d 565 (1954), this statute
was quoted by the court in denying the contention that a church could not take as benefi-
ciary of a residuary trust because the use and purpose of the trust was not shown in the will.
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section 57-7 is restricted to a local congregation; 39 therefore, trusts
for hierarchical churches continue to be invalid in Virginia.40
Moreover, it logically follows that, if Virginia will not recognize an
express trust for a hierarchical church, neither will it recognize an
implied trust for such a church.41 A hierarchical church, however,
can acquire a contract or proprietary right 42 in church property
held by trustees of a local congregation which will be recognized in
Virginia's courts in resolving property disputes between the church
general and the church local. 3
It must also be kept in mind that section 57-7 relates only to
transfers in which the trustee is an individual or an unincorporated
body. Trusts for religious purposes in which the trustee is a corpo-
ration44 historically have been upheld as a matter of common law.45
Thus, a bequest "to the Missionary Society of the Methodist Epis-
copal Church Incorporated by an act of the Legislature of the
State of New York Passed April 9 [,] 1839 '' 41 was held valid without
reference to any statute.
39. See supra text accompanying note 3.
40. In declaring that a testamentary trust to named persons "for the benefit of the New
Jerusalem Church (Swedenborgian) as they shall deem best" was void for uncertainty of
beneficiaries, the court emphasized this by asking if the trust was "for the benefit of all of
the members of that Church, wheresoever they may be, in this and other countries,
or . . . [was] limited to those in the United States, or to such as live in this State where the
textatrix had her domicile, or to those in the State of New York where the trustees reside?"
Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 558, 567, 27 S.E. 446, 447, 449 (1897).
41. See Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 201 S.E.2d 752 (1974). An implied
trust in this context was defined as the concept "that those who unite themselves with a
hierarchical church ... take title to local church property subject to an implied trust for
the general church." Id. at 504, 201 S.E.2d at 755.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
43. Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 201 S.E.2d 752 (1974); see also Green v.
Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 272 S.E.2d 181 (1980).
44. Churches may not incorporate in Virginia. See note 150 infra and accompanying text.
45. See Gallego's Ex'rs v. Attorney Gen., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450 (1832).
46. Missionary Soc'y of M.E. Church v. Calvert, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 357 (1879). Further
language in this will that "all My Executors shall Pay to the Missionary Society a Buve
stated shall Be Paid to the India Mission By that said society of New York" was held to be
precatory and not to create a trust for the India Mission. Id. at 360. A bequest "to the
secretary of the board of foreign missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
and known as 'Southern Presbyterian Church"' was held to be a valid bequest to "The
Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States," a
North Carolina corporation, for the use and benefit of its executive committee of foreign
missions in Trustees v. Guthrie, 86 Va. (11 Hans.) 125, 10 S.E. 318 (1889). The validity of a
bequest to the same entity was upheld in Guthrie v. Guthrie, 1 Va. 717, 10 S.E. 327 (1889).
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2. Religious Purposes versus Charitable Purposes
Although the general American rule treats trusts for religious
purposes as merely one form of charitable trust47 and thus applies
the general rules concerning the validity of charitable trusts
thereto, 8 the Virginia General Assembly "in validating charitable
trusts, made a marked distinction between trusts for religious pur-
poses and trusts for literary or educational purposes. . . which has
continued down to the present time.149 Thus, although the validity
of trusts for religious purposes is addressed by section 57-7, ex-
amined above, the validity of trusts for educational, literary or
other charitable purposes is dealt with by section 55-26.1 of the
Code.50 Accordingly, as section 57-7 is construed as validating only
transfers to a "church" in the local sense, it has been held that a
bequest to a named person in trust for "the Methodist Church
South for missionary work where he thinks it will do the greatest
good" fails under section 57-7 and cannot be saved by reference to
section 55-26.1, the general charitable statute. 1
Notwithstanding this line of demarcation that has been drawn
between trusts for charitable purposes and trusts for religious pur-
poses, there is one sentence in the general charitable statute, sec-
tion 55-26.1, that makes reference to transfers that might be said
to have a "religious" flavor, aspect or motivation. This sentence
provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be so construed as to
give validity to any devise or bequest to or for the use of any unin-
corporated theological seminary. '52 This language has been con-
strued by a federal court as impliedly validating transfers to an
incorporated theological seminary, the court stating that "[w]e
cannot say that [the seminarian purposes of this institution] are
not educational or charitable or that they are too uncertain to
comply with Virginia law."' 53 And, in an early Virginia case, de-
cided at a time when the statute validating indefinite transfers for
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 371 (1959).
48. Id. §§ 348 et seq.
49. Maguire v. Loyd, 193 Va. 138, 143, 67 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1951).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-26.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
51. See Moore v. Perkins, 169 Va. 175, 192 S.E. 806 (1937).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-26.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
53. Williams v. Protestant Episcopal Theological Sem., 198 F.2d 595, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
cert. denied 344 U.S. 864 (1952), rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 894 (1952). The gift was a
bequest in trust for "the Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary in Virginia," a Virginia
corporation, with the income from one-half to be used for scholarships and the income from
the other one-half to be used for current expenses of the seminary. 198 F.2d at 595.
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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
charitable purposes contained the following parenthetical-"other
than for the use of a theological seminary ' 5 4-the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that the quoted language was intended to pre-
vent a theological seminary from receiving a bequest for indefinite
purposes, but was not intended to prevent an incorporated theo-
logical seminary from receiving bequests for definite purposes, i.e.,
the general purposes for which it was incorporated. 5
Moving from the "seminary" sentence in section 55-26.1 to more
general considerations thereunder, in a case involving a residuary
gift in trust "unto that society or organization of the Virginia Con-
ference, Methodist Episcopal Church, South, having as its princi-
ple object the relief of superannuated ministers, of the Virginia
Conference," the trial court determined that (1) the disposition
was not a "religious charity"; (2) it was a valid charitable disposi-
tion; and (3) the organization to receive and administer the gift
was the Conference Board of Finance of the Virginia Conference of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. On appeal, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that as the Conference Board of Finance is
"an unincorporated association elected by 835 other unincorpo-
rated bodies. . . .we are of opinion that it is not a competent trus-
tee to receive, invest and distribute the property here in ques-
tion." 56 However, following familiar principles of trust law, the
court further concluded that naming an incompetent trustee in an
otherwise valid testamentary charitable trust would not render the
trust void. It therefore remanded the case back to the trial court
with instructions to appoint suitable trustees (on motion of the lo-
cal Commonwealth's attorney) to carry out the purpose of the
trust. In another case, involving a residuary gift to "the Trustees of
the Presbyterian Home for Old Ladies situated in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, '57 where there was no such institution, the gift again was
sustained as non-religious and the intended beneficiary was held to
54. VA. CODE of 1873, ch. 77, § 2.
55. Roy's Ex'rs v. Rowzie, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 599 (1874) (holding that a bequest "to the
Baptist Theological Seminary in South Carolina" was a valid bequest to "Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary," a South Carolina corporation). See also Protestant Episcopal Edu-
cation Soc'y v. Churchman's Reps., 80 Va. (5 Hans.) 718 (1885), where the court made sev-
eral references to the general statute dealing with charities in upholding a bequest to a
corporation in the following language: "[T]he trustees of the Protestant Episcopal Educa-
tion Society of Virginia - the said bequest to be used exclusively for educating poor young
men for the Episcopal ministry, upon the basis of evangelical principles now established."
Id. at 719.
56. Fitzgerald v. Doggett's Ex'r, 155 Va. 112, 127, 155 S.E. 129, 134 (1930).
57. Jordan v. Richmond Home, 106 Va. 710, 718, 56 S.E. 730, 733 (1907).
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be the Richmond Home for Ladies, Inc., which provided a home
for "indigent and infirm women of respectable character, especially
such as are connected with the Methodist Episcopal Church,
South, and the Presbyterian Church of the United States. ... 1
The fact that the Home's charter did not specifically authorize it
to receive and administer bequests was "no impediment in the way
of sustaining the validity of the gift; for the bequest [was] in fur-
therance of the express purposes of the corporation, and ample
power was conferred upon it to administer the trust. .... 5
The problem case in this area, Adams v. Cowan,6 0 involved a re-
siduary gift "to the relief of the poor, whether in my kindred or
not, and through proper channels of the Presbyterian Church."61
In this case the court stated that "[ilt is conceded by all the par-
ties in interest that . . . [this gift] is void for uncertainty. That
this is so seems perfectly manifest, hence we will make no further
mention of it."'6 2 This language borders on the inexplicable because
relief of the poor is a textbook illustration of a general charitable
purpose 3 as defined in the earlier case of Fitzgerald v. Doggett's
Executor,6 4 under which a general charitable trust does not fail
even if the named trustee is incompetent; the court merely ap-
points a competent trustee. Moreover, Fitzgerald was decided only
three years prior to Adams. In the absence of any discussion of
these points in Adams, and also because it does not appear from
the report of the case that any representative of the Presbyterian
Church or the Attorney General's Office was a party thereto, either
at trial or on appeal, the precedent value of Adams pales, and it
should not be regarded as having any significance today.
The lesson to be learned from the foregoing cases appears to be
that although a trust may seem to be "religious" at first blush be-
cause of references to religious institutions or persons connected
therewith, it is the "purpose" of the trust that determines whether
it will pass muster under the specific statute dealing with transfers
for a religious purpose (section 55-7) or the broader statute dealing
with charitable purposes generally (section 55-26.1). And it would
58. Id.
59. Id. at 719, 56 S.E. at 733.
60. 160 Va. 1, 168 S.E. 750 (1933).
61. Id. at 7, 168 S.E. at 752.
62. Id. at 4, 168 S.E. at 751-52.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 369.
64. 155 Va. 112, 155 S.E. 129 (1930).
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appear that, except in those instances where the purpose of the
transfer is the "direct" advancement of religion, the new control-
ling statute should be the latter.
3. Books and Furniture
In addition to the statute dealing with the validity of transfers
for religious purposes, Virginia also has a statute, section 57-10, es
dealing with books and furniture given to, or acquired by, a church
or church diocese for use (1) in ceremonies of public worship on its
land, or (2) at the residence of its clergyman. Section 57-10 pro-
vides that the title to such books and furniture shall be vested in
the trustees of the local congregation, to be held by them upon the
same trusts as they hold the land.
4. Maximum Property Holdings
That part of the Virginia Constitution providing that the Gen-
eral Assembly may secure the title to church property "to an ex-
tent to be limited by law""6 is the constitutional basis for section
57-12,6 7 the statute stating the maximum quantity of real estate
and personal estate that church trustees may hold. The general
rule of section 57-12 provides that the maximum quantity of land
that can be held on behalf of a local congregation is four acres in a
city or town and two hundred and fifty acres in any county."" How-
ever, any city or town council, by ordinance, may increase the per-
missible holdings of a local congregation within its jurisdiction up
to fifty acres if the land is used exclusively for certain purposes
enumerated in the statute.6 9 Land that is located in a county at the
time of its acquisition by the church but which subsequently be-
comes city or town land due to annexation, incorporation, etc.,
continues to be "county" land for purposes of the limitations in
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-10 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
66. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14(20).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-12 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
68. The following clause is also found in the statute: "and, provided further, that the
trustees of a church diocese may take or hold not more than two hundred fifty acres in any
one county at any one time. . . ." Id. It is unclear whether this language is a mere redun-
dancy, or whether it restricts the holdings of a church diocese in any county to a total of two
hundred fifty acres regardless of the number of local congregations the diocese may have in
that county.
69. These purposes are: "a church building, chapel, cemetery, offices exclusively used for
administrative purposes of the church, a Sunday-school building and playgrounds therefor,
and parking lots for the convenience of those attending any of the foregoing, and a church
manse, parsonage or a rectory." Id.
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section 57-12. This section also provides that when a merger or
consolidation of local congregations causes these limitations to be
exceeded, the "new" congregation shall have three years within
which to dispose of its excess land.
The maximum amount of money, securities and other personal
property that may be held on behalf of a local congregation is five
million dollars. However, in determining the value of its personal
property for purposes of this limitation, no accounting is required
of the church's books and furniture that are used (1) in ceremonies
of public worship on its land, or (2) at the residence of its
clergyman.
On occasion, a gift that might appear to fail in whole or in part
because of section 57-12 can be saved by proper construction of the
donative language. Thus, in Owens v. Bank of Glade Spring where
the testator left one-half of his residuary estate (which contained
more real estate than the church could hold) to a church and di-
rected that it "be placed in a trust fund and only the interest
used, ' 7 0 the court held that by the quoted language the testator
"necessarily directed that so much of that share as consisted of
real estate be converted into cash to constitute a part of the trust
fund."7 1 Even though a gift to a church cannot be saved by the
constructional route, the Virginia Supreme Court has evidenced a
willingness to save such gifts by the application of established
equitable principles when a proper occasion arises. For example, in
St. Stephen's Episcopal Church v. Morris,72 a case decided before
churches were permitted to receive devises of real estate, the valid-
ity of a gift of a portion of the testator's residuary estate (which
contained real estate) was upheld on two grounds. First, the court
noted that "[t]he disposition made of the estate necessarily in-
volves an equitable conversion of the real estate left into money,
otherwise the purposes of the testator could not be effectuated. '7 3
70. 195 Va. 1138, 1140, 81 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1954).
71. Id. at 1149, 81 S.E.2d at 572.
72. 115 Va. 225, 78 S.E. 622 (1913).
73. Id. at 228, 78 S.E. at 623. Equitable conversion is defined as:
[t]he exchange of property from real to personal or from personal to real, which takes
place under some circumstances in the consideration of the law, such as, to give effect
to directions in a will or settlement, or to stipulations in a contract, although no such
change has actually taken place, and by which exchange the property so dealt with
becomes invested with the properties and attributes of that into which it is supposed
to have been converted.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (5th ed. 1979).
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Secondly, even if the principles of equitable conversion were not
applicable, where, as in the instant case, the majority of the estate
was personal property, the court expressed a willingness to save
the gift by applying the doctrine of marshalling of assets. 4 It
would seem that the equitable principles laid down in this case
would be most appropriate to apply, if the facts will allow, in a
case where a devise or bequest would put a church beyond one of
the permissible limitations of section 57-12, but not the other.
This willingness of the court to save gifts to churches by the ap-
plication of equitable principles, when applicable, clearly does not
extend to allowing the limitations of section 57-12 to be exceeded
either directly or indirectly by the use of separate trusts for the
same congregation. When this latter issue came before the court, it
responded that
[t]he limitations prescribed by section 57-12 include economic
wealth in the form of personal estate under whatever guise it is
maintained so long as the church is the sole beneficiary of the in-
come therefrom, and the $100,000 [now $5,000,000] limitation must
be taken to include the corpus of trust funds in the hands of trus-
tees other than the church trustees and all other personal estate of
the church, exclusive of books and furniture.7 5
Accordingly, the court held void that portion of the testatrix' be-
quest to named trustees for the benefit of a church which, when
added to the church's other countable personal property, exceeded
the statutory limitation.
5. Property Rights Upon Church Division
Notwithstanding the constitutional mandate of absolute reli-
gious freedom in Virginia, "there is no constitutional prohibition
against the resolution of church property disputes by civil courts,
74. 115 Va. at 228, 78 S.E. at 623. The court explained the concept as follows:
A court of equity, in furtherance of the purposes of the testator, would discharge the
interest of the church, under the will, from that portion of the estate which it could
take without objection, and devote the real estate, or its proceeds (to the non-church
uses directed by the testator) which was not an illegal interest and violated no law.
Id.
75. Maguire v. Loyd, 193 Va. 138, 150, 67 S.E.2d 885, 893 (1951).
76. The total bequest was in excess of $375,000; the limitation of § 57-12 at that time was
$100,000; and it was stipulated that the church had $13,300 in intangible personal property
at the time of testatrix' death. The bequest was upheld as to $86,700. Id. at 144, 67 S.E.2d
at 888.
[Vol. 17:1
CHURCH LAW RESTATED
provided that the decision does not depend on inquiry into ques-
tions of faith or doctrine. ' 77 The governing statute before the court
when there is division within a church, section 57-9,11 provides that
when a division or split occurs with a hierarchical church, the local
congregation's "communicants, pewholders, and pewowners," by a
majority vote of those over the age of eighteen years, shall deter-
mine to which branch of the hierarchical church they shall belong.
Thus the statute is consistent with the prior decision of the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in a case arising from the Methodist Episco-
pal Church's agreement to a plan of separation that resulted in one
branch continuing under that name and the other branch being
known as the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. 9
Of course this "majority rule" approach cannot authorize the
majority in a local congregation of a hierarchical church to change
the terms of a conveyance to the church. Such action would impair
the obligation of contract and thus be unconstitutional under the
constitutions of both Virginia and the United States.s0 Accord-
ingly, where the conveyance was "for the use and benefit of the
religious congregation of the Methodist Protestant Church at
Heathsville,"' and a majority of its members later withdrew there-
from and affiliated with the Methodist Episcopal Church, South,
the court held that the minority would retain the church property,
emphasizing that "[t]hese Christians [the majority] could change
their religious faith, had the right to go to any denomination to
which their belief or choice led, and. . . could take with them all
property which belonged to them; but they were without power to
change the character of the trust in question. '8 2
If a local congregation of a hierarchical church decides to be-
come an independent body, it is likewise clear that any proprietary
77. Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 503, 201 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1954).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
79. Brooke v. Shacklett, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 301 (1856).
80. Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. (12 Hans.) 103, 12 S.E. 228 (1890).
81. Id. at 106.
82. Id. See also Hoskinson v. Pusey, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 428 (1879). So also, in Boxwell v.
Affleck, 79 Va. (4 Hans.) 402, 407 (1884), when the general conferences of the Methodist
Episcopal Church and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South created a joint commission to
adjust controversies between the two bodies, an award by this commission of certain prop-
erty to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South was struck down by the court on the ground
that neither the commission, nor the general conferences from which it derived its power,
had any authority to determine the ownership of property which had been devised "to the
trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Berryville." Id.
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right 3 of the church general in local church property cannot be
eliminated by the unilateral action of the local congregation. 4 In
determining whether or not a hierarchical church has any proprie-
tary interest in local church property, the Virginia Supreme Court
has indicated that it would look "to our own statutes, to the lan-
guage of the deed conveying the property, to the constitution of
the general church, and to the dealings between the parties."8' 5
When division occurs within a congregational church, section 57-
9 provides that a majority of its members who are entitled to vote
by its constitution or, in the absence of a written constitution, by
its ordinary practice or custom, may determine the ownership and
control of all property held in trust for the congregation. "But the
majority cannot, by reason of a change of views on religious sub-
jects, divert the use of the property to the support of new and con-
flicting doctrines."86 However, in determining whether or not there
is a diversion of the church's property "to the support of new and
conflicting doctrines," a court may be entering an area of decision
that more recently has been recognized as constitutionally imper-
missible, i.e., a decision that "depend[s] on inquiry into questions
of faith or doctrine. '87 Of course the threshold determination of
whether or note the decision depends upon such an inquiry would
itself seem to some persons to involve an intrusion into the prohib-
ited area. 8 This problem may be illustrated by a case in which
complainants alleged that the congregation was divided "primarily
over points of doctrine and articles of faith, and secondarily over
its rules of practice and government .. ."89 However, in disposing
of the matter, the court concluded that "there is little as to the
differences between the two factions over points of doctrine and
articles of faith, and that little is difficult to comprehend."9 Ac-
83. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
84. Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 201 S.E.2d 752 (1974). See also Green v.
Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 272 S.E.2d 181 (1980).
85. Green, 221 Va. at 555, 272 S.E.2d at 185-86. In this latter connection (dealings be-
tween the parties) the court, though assuming the truth of an allegation that there was no
formal dedication ceremony of the local church, "conclude[d] that 100 years of continuous
services in the church by the pastors supplied Lee Chapel by the A.M.E. Zion Church con-
stitutes an adequate dedication of the property for its intended spiritual and ecclesiastical
purposes." Id. at 554, 272 S.E.2d at 185.
86. Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 695-96, 152 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1967).
87. Norfolk Presbytery, 214 Va. at 503, 201 S.E.2d at 755.
88. This is popularly described as a "catch 22" problem.
89. Cheshire v. Giles, 144 Va. 253, 255, 132 S.E. 479, 479-80 (1926).
90. Id. at 257, 132 S.E. at 480.
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cordingly, the court went on to rule that in the absence of a recon-
ciliation between the two factions, the church property would be-
long to the majority of the congregation, determined "as it existed
when the division occurred." 91
Following a division in either a hierarchical church or in a con-
gregational church, and the proper determination of property
rights, section 57-9 provides that such determination shall be re-
ported to the circuit court having jurisdiction over the property.
Upon the court's approval of this determination of property rights,
and the entry thereof in the court's chancery order book, the Code
states that the determination "shall be conclusive as to the title to
and control of any property held in trust for such congregation,
and be respected and enforced accordingly in all of the courts of
this State."92
B. Authority of Trustees and Ecclesiastical Officers
1. Appointment and Removal of Church Trustees
The circuit court of the city or county wherein a church's land,
or the greater portion thereof, is located is given the authority by
section 57-811 to appoint, remove and replace the church trustees9 4
upon the ex parte application of the proper authorities of the
church or church diocese, if it seems proper to the court to take
such action in order to effect and promote the purpose and object
of the original transfer of the land in question. In a summary pro-
ceeding under the statute, the court's
jurisdiction is special and limited to the appointment and removal
of the trustees. It does not extend to the regulation of the conduct of
the trustees in the administration of the trust under the instrument
creating it. When the trustees are appointed, where none exist, or if
they exist, when they are removed and others appointed to succeed
them, the power of the court under the statute is exhausted. What it
does beyond this is in excess of power, without authority and void. 5
91. Id. at 262, 132 S.E. at 482.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-8 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
94. "It is not necessary under the Virginia statutes that a trustee appointed by the court
to take title to the property of a church be a member of its congregation." Hawthorne v.
Austin Organ Co., 71 F.2d 945, 951 (4th Cir. 1934) (dictum), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 623
(1934).
95. Wade v. Hancock, 76 Va. (1 Hans.) 620, 625 (1882). The power to direct how the
trusts shall be administered is vested in the court "in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
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After their appointment,
the trustees of a church merely hold the legal title to the real estate
conveyed, devised or dedicated for the use and benefit of the reli-
gious congregation, at whose instance they have been appointed, and
have no power of their own volition, and in their capacity as trust-
ees, to either alien or encumber such real estate."
2. Suits by and Against Trustees
Section 57-1111 provides that trustees of a church or church dio-
cese may sue in their own names 8 to recover any realty or person-
alty they hold in trust, or damages for injury thereto, and that
they may be sued in relation to the same. Applying this statute in
an action brought to determine whether or not a judgment against
a certain church's trustees was a lien on church property, the court
found it to be "very plain that this section has no reference to suits
of the character we are considering, but relates only to suits by or
against the trustees personally touching the property, the legal ti-
tle to which is vested in them."9 Section 57-11 also provides a
as a court of equity, and can be invoked only in the mode appropriate to that forum." Id.
96. Globe Furniture Co. v. Trustees of Jerusalem Baptist Church, 103 Va. 559, 561, 49
S.E. 657, 658 (1905).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-11 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
98. The suit will continue in the name of the original trustees by or against whom it was
instituted, even though any of them die or others are appointed. Id.
99. Globe Furniture Co. v. Trustees of Jerusalem Baptist Church, 103 Va. at 561, 49 S.E.
at 658. Accord, Hawthorne v. Austin Organ Co., 71 F.2d at 949 (where the court stated that
"[t]he scope of this section seems to be limited to suits attacking the property or the legal
title vested in the trustees.") In Allen v. Paul, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 332 (1874), the trustees of
Church A successfully brought unlawful detainer proceedings against the trustees of Church
B to recover church property leased to the predecessors of the present trustees of Church B
who now claimed to own the property on several theories. In Hardy v. Wiley, 87 Va. (12
Hans.) 125, 12 S.E. 233 (1890), realty was conveyed to trustees in trust to build thereon "a
house or place for religious worship and for Sabbath school purposes ... and for such other
religious purposes as ... [shall be deemed] necessary and appropriate to further the cause
of Christ and the interests of said church in the community." Id. at 126, 12 S.E. at 233. A
church immediately was constructed thereon and so used continuously for thirty years, at
which time the building having deteriorated and the congregation having grown, it was de-
cided to sell the same and apply the proceeds towards the erection of a parsonage to be used
in connection with a new church house. In a suit brought by original grantor's assignee it
was held that, as the original church was built in accordance with the trust and as there was
no reverter clause or covenant to rebuild in the original deed, the church trustees would be
permitted to make the desired disposition of the property if they proceeded in the mode
prescribed by statute for the conveyance of church property. In Brown v. Virginia Advent
Christian Conference, 194 Va. 909, 76 S.E.2d 240 (1953), where trustees failed to obtain the
required court approval before razing a church building, plaintiffs' tort action for compensa-
tory and punitive damages against trustees and others was dismissed due to plaintiffs' fail-
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remedy in those instances where a church or church diocese has
abandoned real estate or personal property which previously had
been encumbered by its trustees who are no longer living. In such a
case, the beneficiary of the debt secured by the encumbrance may
proceed by suit in equity against the members of the church or
church diocese as parties unknown, by order of publication, in or-
der to subject the property in question to his lien.
3. Suits Concerning Proper Use of Church Property
Section 57-131o authorizes any member of a church or church
diocese to bring suit on its behalf, against its trustees, in order to
compel proper application or use of its real estate or personal
property. This suit may be brought in the plaintiff member's own
name without joining any other member as a party defendant, and
it will proceed as any other suit in equity even if the plaintiff dies
before it reaches final determination. The statute is consistent with
the decision reached prior to its passage in a case where, after a
division occurred in a church, it was alleged that the trustees were
excluding the members of one faction from the church building. To
this charge the court responded that "those who are really mem-
bers of that congregation are entitled to the use of the building
under the provisions of the deed. And if they are improperly ex-
cluded by the trustees, they may be restored to the enjoyment of
their rights and privileges on a bill in chancery filed for the pur-
pose, .. . and in that proceeding also the trustees may be re-
moved, if such removal be proper, and others appointed to take
their places."10'
4. Conveyances and Encumbrances of Church Land
Section 57-14102 authorizes a member of a church or church dio-
cese to bring a suit in equity on its behalf, for the sale or encum-
brance of its lands, against its trustees, in the circuit court in
which the land or the major portion of the land is located. If the
court finds that the requested action is desired by the governing
authority'03 of the church or church diocese, and that the rights of
ure to establish both the membership of the church and its authorization of them to prose-
cute the action.
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-13 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
101. Wade v. Hancock, 76 Va. (1 Hans.) 620, 627 (1882).
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-14 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
103. It is necessary for the court to look at the organizational structure of the church in
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others will not be violated thereby, it is lawful for the court to or-
der the requested action and to make such disposition of any pro-
ceeds as the governing body may desire.
Of greater importance is section 57-15101 which authorizes the
trustees of a church or church diocese to proceed by ex parte peti-
tion in the circuit court in which the land, or the major portion
thereof, is located, not only for the sale or encumbrance of such
lands, but also to "extend encumbrances, improve, exchange the
land, or a part thereof, or settle boundaries between adjoining
property by agreement.' 0 5 If the court finds that the requested
action is desired by the governing authority'016 of the church or
church diocese, it shall order the requested action and the proper
investment of any proceeds.'
Section 57-15.1108 authorizes the court entering an order for the
encumbrance of church property pursuant to section 57-14 or sec-
tion 57-15 to provide in such order that the note evidencing the
debt to be secured thereby may be signed without personal liabil-
ity by the fiscal officer of the church or church diocese and that it
thereby becomes solely the church's obligation. In addition, the
court in such a case, as well as in the case of a conveyance, may
appoint a special commissioner to make the encumbrance or con-
veyance in question. If this practice is followed, the instrument is
recorded in the name of the church or church diocese, not in the
order to determine its governing authority. See Green v. Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 553, 272 S.E.2d
181,184 (1980); Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 500, 502, 201 S.E.2d 752, 755
(1974).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
105. This statute further provides that "[wihen any such religious congregation has be-
come extinct or has ceased to occupy such property as a place of worship, so that it may be
regarded as abandoned property," the petition may be filed by a trustee or a member, as
well as, in the case of a hierarchical church, by the appropriate entity thereof. Id. Any pro-
ceeds that result are to be disposed of "in accordance with the laws of the denomination and
the printed acts of the church or denomination issued by its authority, embodied in book or
pamphlet form, shall be taken and regarded as the law and acts of such denomination or
religious body." Id.
106. See note 103, supra.
107. In Cain v. Rea, 159 Va. 446, 452, 166 S.E. 478, 480 (1932), the court held that "volun-
tary liens or encumbrances can be placed upon church property only by a strict compliance
with the statutes; but, in our opinion, the sections referred to have no application to a
[mechanic's] lien which comes into being by operation of law." The legitimacy of a mechan-
ic's lien against church property was impliedly recognized in Trustees of Franklin Street
Church v. Davis, 85 Va. 193, 7 S.E. 245 (1888). In Globe Furniture Co. v. Trustees of Jerusa-
lem Baptist Church, 103 Va. 559, 561, 49 S.E. 657, 658 (1905) it was held that a default
judgment against church trustees personally is not a lien on church property.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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name of the special commissioner.
Although it is clear that church trustees, as such, have no power
to convey church property without court authorization, this does
not mean that the court will refuse to apply general principles of
equity in appropriate cases, even though such application will re-
sult in recognizing a de facto transfer. Indeed, it might be said that
equitable principles are particularly appropriate in resolving prop-
erty disputes between two religious societies. Thus, in a case where
trustees to whom land was conveyed for the benefit of Church A,
in the absence of any such local church and without court ap-
proval, sold the badly deteriorated property to Church B (which
improved the property at considerable expense) under an arrange-
ment that permitted members of Church A to use the property one
Sunday per month (which they did for thirteen years), an action
brought on behalf of Church A fifteen years after the initial con-
veyance to declare the deed void was held to be barred by the eq-
uitable doctrine of laches.109
5. Property Held by Ecclesiastical Officers
In those instances where the laws, rules or ecclesiastical policy of
any church or religious sect, society or denomination commits the
authority to administer its affairs to its duly elected or appointed
bishop, minister or other ecclesiastical officer, section 57-16110 au-
thorizes such person to receive property for any of such church's
authorized purposes not forbidden by law, and "to hold, improve,
mortgage, sell or convey the same in accordance with such laws,
rules and ecclesiastical polity, and in accordance with the laws of
Virginia." ' This section also provides (1) for automatic transfer of
title to the church's property to such person's duly elected or ap-
pointed successor, (2) that no transfers to the church shall fail on
the grounds of indefiniteness but shall instead be saved for its reli-
gious and benevolent uses, and (3) that the limitations on property
holdings of churches11" shall be applicable to each of its parishes or
congregations. This statute evidences an intent for the general
109. Puckett v. Jessee, 195 Va. 919, 81 S.E.2d 425 (1954). In Linn v. Carson, 73 Va. (32
Gratt.) 170 (1879), the court held that "trustees of a church building, for the use of a con-
gregation of members of the Methodist Church, making advances for repairing the building
have a lien, under the discipline of the church, on the building for such advances, which
may be enforced in equity." Id. at 170 (Reporter's Note).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-16 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
111. Id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76.
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rules applicable to churches that provide for title to their property
to be vested in trustees for their benefit, also to be applicable,
mutalis mutandis, to churches that provide for title to their prop-
erty to be vested in one central figure for their benefit.113
C. Miscellaneous Property Matters
After a church has maintained the undisputed possession of
property for which there is no deed of record for a period of
twenty-five years, it may acquire a deed thereto by following the
procedure established in section 57-17.1"1
As a part of the disestablishment of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in Virginia in 1802, the General Assembly confiscated the
glebe lands held by the Church. At the present time, any remain-
ing glebe lands, or the proceeds thereof, are held by the governing
authority of the county in which the land is located for such non-
religious uses as the local electorate may determine" 5 or, in the
absence of such a determination, for the benefit of the poor."' In
1806, the General Assembly shifted the control of non-religious
charitable trusts, then being exercised by local vestries, to the local
overseers of the poor, in trust, to be applied as originally directed
by the donors. At the present time, this trusteeship is held by the
governing body of the county, city or town. in which the charity
was intended by the donor to be exercised. 1
The laws relating to cemeteries provide that (1) authorization by
county ordinance shall not be required for interment of the dead in
a churchyard;" 8 (2) church trustees may hold property in trust for
113. See, e.g., Maguire v. Loyd, 193 Va. 138, 143, 67 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1951), aff'd on
rehearing, 194 Va. 266, 72 S.E.2d 631 (1952) (First Church of Christ, Scientist, of Lynch-
burg, Virginia, "is not the type of church mentioned" in this section).
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-17 (Repl. Vol. 1981). Traditional adverse possession was alleged
but not proved in Allen v. Paul, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 332 (1874).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3 (1981). All lands or proceeds appropriated for education shall
vest in the local school board to be managed according to the wishes of the donor, the
income therefrom shall be applied in the same manner as the school board's appropriation
from the Literary Fund. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-107 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
116. The statute also allows the "Glebe Fund" in Essex, Middlesex and Lancaster coun-
ties to be used for improvements to the courthouse and related facilities. The following
cases involve the disposition of glebe lands: Seldon v. Overseers of Poor of Loudoun, 38 Va.
(11 Leigh) 127 (1840); Cheatham v. Burfoot, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 580 (1838); Overseers of Poor
of Henrico v. Hart, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 1 (1831); Young v. Pollock, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 517 (1811);
Claughton v. MacNaughton, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 513 (1811); Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call)
113 (1804).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-4 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
118. Id. § 57-28(1).
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its cemetery;' (3) there is no monetary limit on what may be
given towards the original cost of a cemetery, burial lot, monument
or vault,120 but the maximum possible gift for the maintenance of a
cemetery is thirty thousand dollars, and no more than ten thou-
sand dollars can be held at any time for the maintenance of a sin-
gle lot, including its improvements. 2' The provisions dealing with
endowment trusts for perpetual care do not apply to a cemetery
owned and operated by a church,'122 nor do the provisions dealing
with condemnation of abandoned graveyards apply to those owned
by churches. 23
V. CONTRACTS
A. Capacity of the Church to Contract
The contractual capacity of the local church has been the subject
of numerous and conflicting dicta in the Virginia cases. Two pri-
mary reasons for this confusion are (1) the different organizational
structures of the churches in the cases that have come before the
courts, and (2) the interplay of the laws of agency and trusts in
these cases. In an attempt to frame the ultimate issues more
clearly, this section will seek first to deal with the contractual au-
thority and liability of those who purport to act on behalf of a
church and then to deal with the church proper and its members.
The distinction between agents and trustees and the general
rules concerning their liability on contracts has been stated by the
Virginia Supreme Court as follows:
A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and acts for his prin-
cipal, who may be either a natural or artificial person. A trustee may
be defined generally as a person in whom some estate, interest, or
power in or affecting property is vested for the benefit of another.
When an agent contracts in the name of his principal, the principal
contracts and is bound, but the agent is not. When a trustee con-
tracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound, for he has no
principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the contract is therefore
the personal undertaking of the trustee. As a trustee holds the es-
tate, although only with the power and for the purpose of managing
119. Id. § 57-32.
120. Id. § 57-34.
121. Id. § 57-33.
122. Id. § 57-35.9:1.
123. Id. § 57-38.
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it, he is personally bound by the contracts he makes as trustee, even
when designating himself as such.124
It is clear that this statement originally was framed in reference to
trustees generally, and not to church trustees specifically, because
it speaks of the trustee holding the trust estate "with the power
and for the purpose of managing it." As noted earlier," 5 church
trustees have no such power or authority; they merely hold title to
the church's property subject to the will and control of the gov-
erning authority of the church. Nevertheless, that portion of the
statement concerning the personal liability of the trustee on the
contracts that he signs, even though he is acting rightfully, is be-
lieved by many persons to be an accurate statement insofar as
church trustees are concerned. This belief is supported by the lan-
guage of the statute dealing with the court order for the encumber-
ing of church property, which states that the court, upon entering
such an order "may provide that any instrument evidencing a debt
secured by a deed of trust or mortgage made in behalf of [a
church] may be signed without personal liability of the treasurer or
other fiscal officer of such church and thereupon become the obli-
gation solely of the church named therein.' 2 This language pro-
vides the basis for the rhetorical question - Why was it necessary
for the General Assembly to grant unto the courts the power to
eliminate any personal liablity of one contracting on behalf of a
church, and to provide for the sole liability of the latter, unless the
existing common law provided to the contrary, i.e., that one con-
tracting on behalf of a church was liable, even though acting right-
fully, and the church was not?127
The first case to attempt any exploration of the contractual ca-
pacity and liability of a church and its representatives was For-
sberg v. Zehm.12s In this case a music committee appointed by the
governing body of the local congregation (the board of stewards) of
a hierarchical church entered into an employment contract with
124. Catlett v. Hawthorne, 157 Va. 372, 378, 161 S.E. 47, 48 (1931), quoting Taylor v.
Davis, 110 U.S. 330, 334-35 (1884).
125. See supra text accompanying note 96; see also supra note 103.
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
127. Of course general principles of trust law permit contracts made by a trustee and any
third party to provide for the nonliability of the trustee. However, while the parties may
expressly exclude the trustee's liability, they cannot by their own actions bind the trust
estate. See Catlett, 157 Va. at 37, 161 S.E. at 48.
128. 150 Va. 756, 143 S.E. 284 (1928).
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Zehm, an organist/choir director. 129 When the board of stewards
terminated his employment contract approximately seventeen
months later, under circumstances that Zehm believed amounted
to a breach of contract,1 30 he brought an action at law against them
to recover damages. The board of stewards demurred on the
ground "that Zehm contracted, through the music committee as
agents, with a known principal, the Ghent Methodist Episcopal
Church, South, named in the instrument, and therefore the agents
are not liable to suit, and no one is so liable except the disclosed
principal . *...,, In affirming the trial court's action in overrul-
ing the demurrer, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the
board's proposition was not tenable. Instead, the court stated:
In the instant case there was no community of interest for business
purposes between the members of the church. The board of stew-
ards was from necessity the recognized instrumentality for handling
the current funds, and, if they saw fit, for making contracts in refer-
ence to the use and disbursement of the funds. The music commit-
tee was an agent for the board, and it is manifest that they were so
considered from the minutes put in evidence and from the testi-
mony of its members. Zehm looked to the board for the payment of
his salary. The music committee acted under the authority of the
board 1 32 . .. and we are of opinion, therefore, that the members of
the board are jointly and severally liable to Zehm. s13
In dictum, the Forsberg court went on to enunciate the contractual
capacity of a church as follows: "There must be competent parties
to a contract. However it may be in other States, in Virginia a
church or its congregation cannot contract, certainly not unless
perhaps by reason of a specially held meeting and through a spe-
cial committee appointed by the members attending such
meeting. ' '1 34
This Forsberg dictum was brought back before the court four
years later in Cain v. Rea,135 a case in which an architect was seek-
129. The agreement was "between Ghent Methodist Episcopal Church South by its music
committee, party of the first part, and Harry J. Zehm. . . ." Id. at 760, 143 S.E. at 285.
130. The case contains a lengthy discussion of a "satisfactory performance" clause in the
contract of a church organist/choir director.
131. Forsberg, 150 Va. at 764, 143 S.E. at 286.
132. Id. at 766, 143 S.E. at 287.
133. Id. at 768, 143 S.E. at 287.
134. Id. at 766, 143 S.E. at 287.
135. 159 Va. 446, 166 S.E. 478 (1932).
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ing to enforce a mechanic's lien on a church building for the bal-
ance due for his labor in designing and supervising its construc-
tion. The church in Cain was congregational in form of
government, and the architect's contract had been approved in a
congregational meeting prior to its execution by the church trust-
ees. The court disagreed with the defendants' contention concern-
ing the lack of a church's contractual capacity, which was based
upon the Forsberg dictum, and stated that "[i]n so far as [that]
language impliedly conflicts with the views expressed in this opin-
ion it is disapproved."' 3 However, it does not appear that the For-
sberg dictum conflicts at all with the holding in Cain. The For-
sberg dictum allows for the possibility of a church contracting "by
reason of a specially held meeting"'3 7 and the contract in Cain was
approved by the congregation in such a meeting. In holding that
the architect "entered into a valid contract of employment with
the congregation of the church, and that. . . he is entitled to file a
mechanic's lien upon the church property, ' 13 8 the court overruled
the further contention that the conveyancing/encumbering stat-
utes3 9 prohibited a church congregation from making a contract
affecting its property without court approval. In answer to this
contention, the court found that the statutes
provide a convenient method for the sale or mortgaging of church
property. They are barriers over which neither trustees nor individ-
ual members can step in order to destroy the corpus. They do not
prohibit a church, in a congregational meeting, duly called in con-
formity with the rules of the church, from entering into a contract
with a laborer or materialman to perform labor or furnish
material.'
In Hawthorne v. Austin Organ Co.,'4 ' the plaintiffs brought an
action in federal court seeking a personal recovery from trustees
who executed certain promissory notes on behalf of their church.
The church was congregational in form of government, and the
136. Id. at 459, 166 S.E. at 483.
137. Forsberg, 150 Va. at 766, 143 S.E. at 287.
138. Cain, 159 Va. at 459, 166 S.E. at 483.
139. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-14 to -15.1 (Repl. VoL 1981). For a discussion of these statutes,
see supra text accompanying notes 102-09.
140. Cain, 159 Va. at 452-53, 166 S.E. at 480.
141. 71 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 623 (1934). This case discusses the
other Virginia cases reported in this section, but it does not come to all of the same
conclusions.
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contract and notes were authorized in a congregational meeting
before they were executed by the trustees, who signed them in
their own names as trustees of the church. Upon the trial, the Dis-
trict Court held that the trustees were personally liable on these
notes based upon the general rule that a trustee is always liable on
his contracts, even though acting rightfully, unless the contract
provides to the contrary. 142 But, on appeal, it was held that "[t]he
general rule, however, has been modified, so far as negotiable in-
struments are concerned, by Section 20 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law" 143 which provided that one who signs a negotiable in-
strument in which his representative capacity is disclosed is not
liable thereon if, in fact, he is authorized to sign.144 In other cases
brought against church trustees individually, it has been held that
(1) the personal liability of trustees who assumed a mortgage and
their rights, if any, against the church property could not be deter-
mined where only two of the five trustees were made parties to the
suit; 45 (2) a trustee who accepted a draft without the approval of
the congregation or the other trustees was the only person liable
thereon;'4' and, (3) trustees who secured a trial court determina-
tion that they had no authority to execute a note on their church's
behalf were personally liable thereon.147
No case has been found where individuals were sought to be held
liable in their capacity as members of a church. However, in dic-
tum in Catlett v. Hawthorne,148 the court quotes with approval
from a legal encyclopedia as follows:
142. For a statement of the general rule, see Catlett v. Hawthorne, 157 Va. 372, 377-79,
161 S.E. 47, 48-49 (1931).
143. Hawthorne, 71 F.2d at 946.
144. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law has been replaced by VA. CODE ANN. §
8.3-403 (Repl. Vol. 1965). According to the Virginia Comment to this section, "Subsection
8.3-403(2) by necessary implication accords with" this aspect of Hawthorne. Another com-
mon law matter now regulated by commercial statute arose in Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Sny-
der, 148 Va. 381, 138 S.E. 477 (1927), which involved a church treasurer making unautho-
rized loans at the bank, depositing the proceeds in the church's account, and then writing
unauthorized checks on these funds for his own benefit. Upon discovery of the fraud the
bank unilaterally set off the amounts of these loans against funds of the church in its pos-
session. It was held to be a jury question whether the loss should be borne (1) by the bank
for dealing with the treasurer or (2) by the church for failure to examine its bank statements
within a reasonable time. This matter is now dealt with by VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.4-406 (Cum.
Supp. 1982).
145. Lynchburg Perpetual Building & Loan Co. v. Fellers, 96 Va. 337, 31 S.E. 505 (1898).
146. Building Supplies Corp. v. Jeffress, 140 Va. 592, 125 S.E. 704 (1924).
147. Catlett v. Hawthorne, 157 Va. 372, 381, 161 S.E. 47, 49 (1931).
148. 157 Va. 372, 161 S.E. 47 (1931).
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Members of an unincorporated church organization, who are actu-
ally instrumental in incurring liabilities for it, or who either author-
ize or ratify its transactions or those made in its name, are person-
ally liable therefor, while those who in no way participate in such
transactions are exempt from liability. Thus it has been held that
the members composing a building committee of an unincorporated
church organization in charge of the work of constructing a church
are individually liable for material furnished them for building, al-
though it is charged to the organization and the seller was informed
that the material would be paid for out of the proceeds of church
fairs, voluntary subscriptions, and donations.149
B. Consequences of Church Status as An Unincorporated
Association
A further expression of the repugnancy towards the establish-
ment of any religion in Virginia is found in the provision of the
Virginia Constitution that "[tihe General Assembly shall not grant
a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomina-
tion .... -150 Accordingly, the local church is treated as an unin-
corporated association and, as in the case of other such associa-
tions, it may sue"" and be sued in the name by which it is
commonly known, and judgments and executions against it will
bind its real and personal property in like manner as if it were
incorporated. 152 In a proceeding against a church, service of process
may be made upon any officer, trustee, director, staff member or
other agent 53 and, perhaps, by order of publication in some
149. Id. at 377, 161 S.E. at 48, quoting 23 R.C.L. 432. See also Lackey v. Price, 142 Va.
789, 128 S.E. 268 (1925).
150. VA. CONST. art. IV § 14(20). After making an historical review of the subject, the
Virginia Supreme Court concluded that "it is perfectly clear that it never occurred to the
legislature of Virginia that to incorporate church agencies essential to the accomplishment
of church work, was the same thing as the incorporation of the churches respectively in
whose interests such corporate agencies have been created and still exist." Trustees v. Guth-
rie, 86 Va. (11 Hans.) 125, 138, 10 S.E. 318, 322 (1889).
151. In Perkins v. Seigfried's Adm'r, 97 Va. 444, 34 S.E. 64 (1899), an individual plaintiff
filed a petition in a pending suit for the settlement of a decedent's estate seeking to recover
a debt owed to his church by the decedent's estate. Plaintiff alleged "that he was a member
of the Presbyterian Church of Charlottesville and that he sued on behalf of himself and the
other four hundred members of that church, who were too numerous to admit of their all
suing at law." Id. at 450-51, 34 S.E. at 66. These allegations not being denied, it was held
that "this proceeding, in the form in which it was brought, was proper." Id. at 451, 34 S.E.
at 66.
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-15 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-305 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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instances.""
It is also clear that churches have access to the courts for the
resolution of disputes that involve purely internal matters, as well
as the previously discussed proceedings dealing with the ownership
of property upon church division.155 Thus, in Carr v. Union
Church of Hopewell,156 the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding brought by the church against the members of its banking
committee (1) to require them to turn certain funds over to the
building committee, and (2) to require them to recognize their re-
placement on the banking committee by other persons. The court
concluded that the matters before it "involved only civil and prop-
erty rights. Ecclesiastical beliefs, matters of church doctrine and
polity and the like were entirely absent. 1 57 When an intra-church
dispute does involve ecclesiastical matters, then, in addition to the
state constitutional matters previously .noted,1 55 federal constitu-
tional questions also arise. Thus in a recent federal case wherein
plaintiffs alleged that, after a dispute arose concerning the authen-
ticity of their glossalalia (speaking in tongues), they were expelled
from the church in a meeting containing many procedural defects,
the court found itself
compelled by the First Amendment to avoid adjudicating the issue
of whether the plaintiffs' expulsion was in accordance with the pro-
cedure prescribed by the Church of God of Prophecy. This is the
proper conclusion even though such adjudication may involve more
procedural incidents of church governance rather than more clearly
identifiable doctrinal disputations. It is clear ... that both proce-
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-316(3) (Curn. Supp. 1982).
155. In Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 152 S.E.2d 23 (1967), an action characterized by
the court as "intracongregational strife," the complainants "brought suit to establish their
right to control the activities of the [Congregational] Church and the use of its property."
Id. at 695, 152 S.E.2d at 24. The court held that
[i]f the defendants so request, the Circuit Court will direct the holding of a congrega-
tional meeting for the purposes of electing or reelecting Elders and Deacons and rati-
fying or repudiating the congregation's previous decision to sever all relationship with
the Virginia Christian Missionary Society. The Court, upon being satisfied that the
meeting was duly called and held, will approve the resolution adopted by a majority
of the members of the congregation who were present at the meeting and entitled to
vote as prescribed in Code § 57-9 and, if requested by the majority, will enter an
injunction as prayed in the bill or cross bill.
Id. at 700, 152 S.E.2d at 28.
156. 186 Va. 411, 42 S.E.2d 840 (1947).
157. Id. at 417, 42 S.E.2d at 843.
158. See supra text accompaying notes 87-91.
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dural-governance questions and doctrinal disputes are constitution-
ally removed from the court's review.158
VI. LIABILITY IN TORT
In Rohr v. Richmond,60 a state circuit court case brought
against a city and the trustees of a city church to recover for dam-
ages suffered by plaintiff due to a defective cellar-cap constructed
by the church on city property, the jury found the trustees primar-
ily liable. The trial judge set the jury verdict aside and ordered a
new trial because "it has been shown that the trustees of the First
Baptist Church were not charged with the duty the declaration
seeks to impose upon them."' 1 In the course of its opinion, the
trial judge also observed, regarding the church lawyer's argument
that churches enjoyed immunity from tort claims, that "[w]hile it
has been so held in many jurisdictions, it would seem from recent
decisions that the doctrine of total immunity from liability of reli-
gious societies for tort has, upon reason and authority, been re-
jected. 1 62 However, when this dictum was later relied on by a
plaintiff in a tort action brought directly against a church it was
construed "to mean that, like charitable institutions generally, a
church does not enjoy 'total immunity . . . in tort,' its immunity
being limited to torts committed against beneficiaries of its
bounty."' 3 Accordingly, concluding that the plaintiff in this case
was a beneficiary of the church's bounty,164 the trial court's dismis-
sal of plaintiff's action was affirmed.
In an intra-church matter wherein plaintiffs sought preliminary
injunctive relief and two and one-half million dollars in punitive
159. Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444, 448 (W.D. Va. 1981). For another aspect of this
case, see infra note 166.
160. 20 VA. L. REG. 260 (1914).
161. Id. at 266.
162. Id. at 262.
163. Egerton v. R. E. Lee Memorial Church, 395 F.2d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1968).
164. The primary facts upon which this determination was made were as follows:
While not maintained as a tourist attraction, the local tourist center in Lexington in
its tourist guidebook has identified the Church sanctuary, and particularly its stained
glass windows, one of which was installed upside down, as a place of local historic
interest and significance. The plaintiff, a citizen of North Carolina, while visiting in
Lexington, entered the defendant's sanctuary during daylight hours for the purpose
of viewing the sanctuary and its stained glass windows. The sanctuary was unlighted
save for the sunlight refracted through the stained glass windows. While so visiting,
the plaintiff fell into an open stairway, receiving the injuries for which recovery is
sought in this action.
Id. at 382.
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damages based upon their alleged improper expulsion from the
church and arrest for criminal trespass after ignoring a notice not
to return to the church, the gravamen of plaintiffs' claim was that
they had been deprived of constitutionally protected rights in con-
travention of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1s5 However, the court
held that the plaintiffs were not deprived of any rights cognizable
under the first, fifth or fourteenth amendments and that, even if
they had been, the required element of "state action" was
lacking."' 6
In Ward v. Conner,161 plaintiff brought an action against thirty-
three persons (including his parents), alleging that their actions in
attempting to "de-program" him of his religious beliefs in the Uni-
fication Church amounted to a conspiracy to deprive him of his
civil rights, statutory conspiracy, assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and grand larceny. On a motion to dismiss, the District Court
held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under ei-
ther the federal civil rights conspiracy statute1 68 or the Virginia
business conspiracy statute,6 9 and that Virginia law did not recog-
nize either a common law action for invasion of privacy or the tort
theory of grand larceny. The first of these rulings subsequently was
reversed on appeal, the court stating that "we think it reasonable
to conclude that religious discrimination, being akin to invidious
racial bias, falls within the ambit of § 1985(c), and that the plain-
tiff and other members of the Unification Church constitute a class
which is entitled to invoke the statutory remedy. 17
0
VII. MARRIAGE
In addition to the provision for the appointment of lay persons
in every city and county in the state to perform the ceremony of
marriage, Virginia law also authorizes the circuit courts to li-
cense a minister of any religious denomination to perform mar-
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
166. Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1981). The "state action" alleged was (1)
the appointment of the church's trustees under VA. CODE ANN. § 57-8 (RepL Vol. 1981), and
(2) the state's prosecution of the trespass warrants obtained by the church's trustees.
167. 495 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976).
169. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499, -500 (RepL VoL 1982).
170. Ward v. Conner, 657 F.2d 45, 48 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'g 495 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va.
1980).
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-25 (Curn. Supp. 1982).
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riages, upon proof of (1) his ordination 17 2 and his being in regular
communion 173 with his denomination, or (2) his possession of a lo-
cal minister's license and that he is serving as a regularly ap-
pointed pastor in his denomination. 1 4 This statute was brought
before the Virginia Supreme Court in Cramer v. Commonwealth"75
after defendants' authority to celebrate marriages was rescinded
following a show cause order and hearing in the circuit court. The
defendants in this matter were all "ordained" ministers of the Uni-
versal Life Church, Inc., a California non-profit corporation. The
court noted, among other things, that
Universal has no traditional doctrine. Its only dogma is that each
person believe that which is right and that each person shall judge
for himself what is right. Universal ministers are ordained (either by
the home office or by any other minister) without question of their
faith for a free-will offering....
The court concluded that "we cannot fit the Universal Life
Church, Inc., within any definition of church, religious society or
organization, found in any dictionary or in any decided case." ''
This observation was stated by the court to be of no importance to
its decision, however, because of the court's recognition of defen-
dants' right of religious freedom. Instead, the court affirmed the
revocation of defendants' licenses on the ground that the word
"minister", as used in section 20-23, was to be narrowly defined
and that
in Universal every living person is not only eligible for membership,
but eligible for immediate ordination into the ministry, with all the
benefits of that profession. We do not believe that the General As-
sembly ever intended to qualify, for licensing to marry, a minister
whose title and status could be so casually and cavalierly
acquired. 178
172. "Neither the word 'ordination' nor 'communion' is used here in an ecclesiastical
sense for the legislature was not concerned with the religious aspect of the marriage cere-
mony." Cramer v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 561, 565, 202 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1974).
173. Id. at 565, 202 S.E.2d at 914.
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-23 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
175. 214 Va. 561, 202 S.E.2d 911 (1974).
176. Id. at 562, 202 S.E.2d at 912.
177. Id. at 566, 202 S.E.2d at 915.
178. Id. at 567, 202 S.E.2d at 915. The court rejected the Commonwealth's request for a
more narrow construction of "minister" to include only those who are so employed on a full
time basis, noting that "it is a matter of common knowledge that there are many ministers
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The Virginia statutes relating to marriage further provide (1) for
the appointment of one member of a religious society that has no
ordained minister to solemnize the marriages of its members;" 9 (2)
that the person officiating at any marriage ceremony must certify
the same to the official who issued the marriage license within five
days of the marriage;180 (3) that any minister who fails to so certify
is subject to a fine of twenty-five dollars;181 (4) that person author-
ized to solemnize marriages may charge a fee not to exceed twenty
dollars therefor;1s2 (5) that one who performs the ceremony of mar-
riage knowing that he lacks the authority is subject to confinement
in jail not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding five hun-
dred dollars; 83 and (6) that one who knowingly solemnizes a mar-
riage where one of the parties is legally incompetent (except when
the female party is over forty-five) is subject to confinement in jail
not exceeding ninety days and a fine not exceeding one hundred
dollars."'
VIII. SUNDAY LAWS
The most litigated issues under this heading are the validity and
applicability of the Sunday Closing Law,'8 " which makes it a mis-
demeanor to engage in work, labor or business except (1) in certain
circumstances enumerated in the statute, or (2) in counties or cit-
ies which by referenda have determined that this law is not neces-
sary.'8" Although it is obvious that Sunday laws were originally
motivated by religious considerations
[t]he forerunner of the present Sunday law, with clearly secular pur-
poses, was adopted in Virginia in 1779 ....
[T]he law is well settled in Virginia that a Sunday law enacted
in Virginia who serve their congregations with complete fidelity and efficiency while holding
outside employment and deriving the major portion of their income from such employ-
ment." Id. at 564, 202 S.E.2d at 913.
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-26 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
180. Id. §32.1-267 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
181. Id. § 20-24 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
182. Id. § 20-27 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
183. Id. § 20-28.
184. Id. §§ 20-46(3),(7) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
185. Id. § 18.2-341 (Repl. Vol. 1982). VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-343 (Repl. Vol. 1982) exempts
from the operation of the Sunday Closing Law one who (1) conscientiously believes that the
seventh day of the week ought to be observed as a Sabbath, (2) actually refrains from all
secular business and labor on that day, and (3) does not compel an employee not of his
belief to do secular work or business on a Sunday.
186. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-342 IRepl. Vol. 1982); id. § 15.1-29.5 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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under the police powers of the State for the purpose of providing a
day of rest for persons, to prevent the physical and moral debase-
ment which comes from uninterrupted labor does not infringe upon
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.18 7
Other statutes dealing with a day of rest are found in that part
of the Virginia Code dealing with the protection of employees.
These statutes provide (1) that, in addition to all other time off
from work, every employee shall be allowed at least twenty-four
consecutive hours of rest in each calendar week, unless an emer-
gency arises;188 (2) that non-managerial employees may select Sun-
day as that day of rest; 89 (3) that those non-managerial employees
who observe Saturday as a Sabbath may select it as their day of
rest;190 (4) that, except for those engaged in the sale of food, ice
and beverages, the choices described in (2) and (3), above, are not
available to those persons working in the "permissible" businesses
described in the Sunday Closing Law;19' and, (5) that any em-
ployer who in any way penalizes an employee for exercising these
rights is guilty of a misdemeanor and must also pay the employee
triple wages for any hours worked on his chosen day of rest.'92
Other Sunday laws prohibit, with some exceptions, (1) taking oys-
ters (except by hand) or loading them on a vessel on Sunday; 93 (2)
taking clams on Sunday;9 4 (3) taking crabs for commercial purpose
on Sunday; 95 and (4) hunting on Sunday. 9 '
Within the judicial system, it is provided that (1) when the time
limitation for beginning or taking any step in a legal proceeding
187. Mandell v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 988, 121 S.E.2d 516, 523-24 (1961). Other cases
upholding the constitutionality of the Sunday Closing Law, and determining its application
in specific factual situations are: Malibu Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 467,
237 S.E.2d 782 (1977); Bonnie Belo Enterprises, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 84, 225
S.E.2d 395 (1976); Rich v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 445, 94 S.E.2d 549 (1956); Petit v. Roa-
noke, 183 Va. 816, 33 S.E.2d 633 (1945); Francisco v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 371, 23 S.E.2d
234 (1942); Williams v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 741, 20 S.E.2d 493 (1942); Crook v. Com-
monwealth, 147 Va. 593, 136 S.E. 565 (1927); Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 713,
114 S.E. 764 (1922) and Lakeside Inn v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 696, 114 S.E. 769 (1922).
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
189. Id. § 40.1-28.2.
190. Id. § 40.1-28.3.
191. Id. § 40.1-28.5.
192. Id. § 40.1-28.4.
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-139 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
194. Id. § 28.1-139.1 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
195. Id. § 28.1-172.
196. Id. § 29-143 (Repl. Vol. 1979). This section also declares Sunday to be " a rest day
for all species of wild bird and wild animal life."
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ends on Sunday, it is extended to the next working day;197 (2)
courts and other legal proceedings are not to be held on Sunday;198
and (3) no civil process is to be served on Sunday except in cases
of escapees or where expressly authorized by law.199 However, at-
tachment of property in civil cases may be issued and executed on
Sunday.2 00
IX. MISCELLANEOUS CHURCH-RELATED MATTERS
Special rules applicable to the clergy provide (1) that ministers
of the gospel are privileged from arrest under civil process while
engaged in performing religious services in a place where a congre-
gation is assembled, and while going to and returning from that
place;20'1 (2) that ministers of the gospel licensed to preach accord-
ing to the rules of their sect (who were totally exempt from jury
service until July 1, 1980) may be exempted from jury service dur-
ing a particular term of court only upon the court finding that such
service would cause a particular occupational inconvenience;20 2 (3)
that communications between ministers of religion and persons
they counsel or advise generally are privileged from disclosure in
any civil action;203 (4) that the laws dealing with the licensing of
those engaged in the behavioral science professions are not appli-
cable to clergymen whose activities are within the scope of the per-
formance of their ministerial duties (a) if no charge is made there-
for, or (b) under the auspices of a church to whom the clergyman
remains accountable;2 '" and (5) a minister who knowingly makes a
false written statement in connection with certifying a marriage is
guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.'05
Church-related criminal and traffic offenses are (1) burning or
destroying a meeting house;206 (2) willfully and maliciously break-
ing any window or door of a house of worship, injuring or defacing
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.3:1 (Repl. Vol. 1979). See also Harris v. Sparrow, 146 Va. 747,
132 S.E. 694 (1926), and Bowles v. Brauer, 89 Va. 466, 16 S.E.356 (1892).
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.27 (Repl. Vol. 1979). See also Lee v. Willis, 99 Va. 16, 37 S.E.
826 (1900); Read v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 924 (1872); and Michie v. Michie's
Adm'rs, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 109 (1866).
199. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-289 (Repl. VoL 1977).
200. Id. § 8.01-542.
201. Id. § 8.01-327.2(6).
202. Id. § 8.01-341.2 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
203. Id. § 8.01-400.
204. Id. § 54-944(c) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
205. Id. § 18.2-207 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
206. Id. § 18.2-79.
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the same, or destroying or carrying away any furniture there-
from;20 7 (3) trespass at night upon church property;20 8 (4) carrying
a dangerous weapon to a place of worship while a religious meeting
is being held, without good and sufficient reason; 09 (5) handling
poisonous or dangerous snakes in such manner as to endanger the
life or health of any person;210 (6) willfully, or while intoxicated,
disrupting a meeting at a place of religious worship (which cannot
be merely the utterance or display of any words);211 (7) operation
of a motor vehicle upon any driveway or premises of a church reck-
lessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb
or property of any person;212 and (8) engaging in an unauthorized
race between two or more motor vehicles upon the driveway or
premises of a church.213
Health-related statutes provide (1) that a parent or custodian of
a minor child who knowingly fails to secure prompt and adequate
medical attention for a child injured by a member of the household
solely because the child is being furnished Christian Science treat-
ment by a duly accredited Christian Science practitioner is not
guilty of what, otherwise, would be a Class 1 misdemeanor; 214 (2)
that a parent or custodian of a minor child who obtains treatment
for the child solely by spiritual means through prayer in accor-
dance with the tenets and practices of a "recognized church or reli-
gious denomination" shall not, for that reason alone, be considered
guilty of the Class 5 felony of neglecting to provide for a child's
health so as to cause the life or health of such child to be seriously
injured;21 5 (3) that the laws dealing with licensing those who care
for or treat mentally ill or retarded persons do not authorize or
require the licensing of those who do so by the practice of the reli-
gious tenets of any church in the ministration to the sick and suf-
fering by mental or spiritual means without the use of any drug or
material remedy;21 6 and (4) that the laws dealing with licensing
207. Id. § 18.2-138.
208. Id. § 18.2-128.
209. Id. § 18.2-283.
210. Id. § 18.2-313.
211. Id. § 18.2-415. A predecessor of this statute was held applicable to one who, by blow-
ing a tin horn, disturbed sleeping campers at a religious retreat after all religious services
had been completed for the day. Commonwealth v. Jennings, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 806 (1846).
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-190(k) (Cur. Supp. 1982).
213. Id. § 46.1-191 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
214. Id. § 18.2-314 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
215. Id. § 18.2-371.1.
216. Id. § 37.1-188 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
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those engaged in the practice of medicine and the healing arts do
not prohibit or require the licensing of the practice of the religious
tenets of any church in the ministration to the sick and suffering
by mental or spiritual means without the use of any drug or mate-
rial remedy. 17
Laws that provide exemptions or other special treatment to reli-
gious organizations are as follows: (1) organizations operated exclu-
sively for religious purposes are among those organizations permit-
ted to conduct raffles, bingo and instant bingo games; 218 (2) a
reasonable number of signs of six square feet or less denoting the
name and location of a church, and directions for reaching the
same, are excepted from the statutes regulating outdoor advertis-
ing;219 (3) the state laws governing restaurants are not applicable to
(a) churches which hold occasional dinners and bazaars of one or
two days duration at which food is offered for sale to the public,
and (b) churches which serve meals to their members as a regular
part of their religious observances; 220 (4) religious organizations
may limit the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings they own for
non-commercial purposes to members of their own religion without
being in violation of Virginia's Fair Housing Law;221 (5) the insur-
ance laws of Virginia do not apply to intra-church mutual aid soci-
eties created prior to 1935 to provide members with casualty insur-
ance;2 2 2 (6) the annual fee for registration of a bus used exclusively
for transportation to and from Sunday school or church for the
purpose of divine worship is twenty dollars or, if its empty weight
exceeds four thousand pounds, twenty-five dollars;22 3 (7) the Solici-
tations of Contributions Act does not apply to any church or con-
vention or association of churches, primarily operated for non-sec-
ular purposes, none of whose net income inures to the direct
benefit of any individual;22' (8) a commercial advertisement that
any person is not welcome, or is objectionable, or is not acceptable,
because of his religion, at any place to which the public is admitted
is a public nuisance and may be abated by injunctive relief except
in the case of (a) private establishments, (b) educational institu-
217. Id. 8 54-276.2 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
218. Id. §§ 18.2-334.2, -340.1 to .14 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
219. Id. 8 33.1-355(18) (Repi. Vol. 1976).
220. Id. §§ 35.1-25(3), (5) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
221. Id. 8 36-92 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
222. Id. 8 38.1-42.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
223. Id. 8 46.1-149(10) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
224. Id. 8 57-48(2) (Repl. Vol. 1981).
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tions or camps where admission is based on religious belief or affili-
ation, and (c) gatherings held under the auspices of any religious
group or sect;225 (9) the power to make gifts for religious purposes
is one of the general powers conferred upon all stock and non-stock
corporations;226 (10) ministers, as well as all employees of churches,
conventions or associations of churches (or religious organizations
they control or provide the primary support for) are not "employ-
ees" for purposes of the Virginia Unemployment Compensation
Act unless their employment unit elects to be covered thereby;"'
and (11) child-care centers operated by religious institutions are
exempt from state law licensing provisions provided that certain
statements and disclosure are made to the public and certain docu-
mentary evidence is provided to the state.228
X. CONCLUSION
The foregoing represents all of the Virginia statutes and cases
relating to churches that were found during the research for this
article, except those relating to tax matters. An article discussing
the tax laws affecting churches in Virginia, which will focus on fed-
eral as well as state law, will soon follow.
225. Id. § 57-2.1.
226. Id. §§ 13.1-2.1(m), -204.1(m) (Repl. Vol. 1978).
227. Id. §§ 60-1-14(d), -100 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
228. Id. § 63.1-196.3 (Repl. Vol. 1980). This exemption was challenged in Forest Hills
Early Learning Center v. Lukhard, 480 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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